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The tax rises and public spending cuts
announced in June’s emergency budget
aim to tackle the greatest challenge for
the new government – reducing the
budget deficit and stabilising net public
debt. But they also risk pushing an
economy weakened by the financial
crisis and the biggest fall in output since
the 1930s back into recession.
It remains to be seen whether the
coalition is pursuing excessive austerity,
but the fiscal measures mean tighter
times ahead for almost everyone. Two
areas of public spending, however, are
currently set to escape the axe –
healthcare and international
development. Both have been the focus
of recent work by researchers at the
Centre for Economic Performance (CEP).
In healthcare, CEP research has
found that the policy reforms in the
last decade to increase competition
among NHS hospitals have raised
management quality and improved
efficiency and clinical outcomes 
(a forthcoming study by Zack Cooper
and colleagues and a recent paper by
CEP’s director John Van Reenen). 
This research illustrates how policy-
makers can get more value for money
from the health service instead of
rationing care for cancer, lengthening
waiting times or cutting staff.
The first article in this CentrePiece
also suggests opportunities for greater
productivity, in this case getting more
for less – in terms of poverty reduction
– from aid spending. CEP researcher
Peter Boone (who is implementing
several aid projects aimed at improving
children’s education and health in
extremely poor regions of India and
Africa) argues that if the UK’s aid
budget were spent well, current
funding levels would be more than
adequate and lower levels not
inconceivable.
Boone is also a member of the LSE’s
Future of Finance Group, convened by
CEP’s founder director Richard Layard
and Paul Woolley of the Centre for the
Study of Capital Market
Dysfunctionality. The group will be
presenting its findings at a conference
in mid-July on ‘The future of finance –
and the economic theory that 
underpins it’. Reports follow in our 
next issue.
Meanwhile, in this one, we’re
following the current global obsession
with football. Alex Bryson and
colleagues report on studies that use
the sport as an arena for investigating
how people respond to incentives and
how labour markets work. And Lant
Pritchett and CEP’s Martina Viarengo
use the World Cup as an analogy for
countries’ efforts to produce highly
skilled individuals through their
education systems.
Elsewhere, there are pieces on
European responses to climate change,
challenges for world trade and the
unintended consequences of smoking
bans in public places. And we end up
back at the recession, and the
surprisingly small fall in UK employment
to date. The big question is what
happens to jobs when the austerity
measures take hold.
Romesh Vaitilingam
Editor
romesh@vaitilingam.com
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T
he 2010/11 UK foreign
aid budget is £7.8
billion, having risen from
£5.5 billion in 2008/09.
Every major political
party rhetorically backs
higher aid levels or, at the very least,
maintaining current levels. 
Yet opinion polls have registered some
concern as to whether aid brings value for
taxpayers’ money. There are fears that it
wastes money, buoys corrupt governments
without affecting the poor for whom it
was intended or even, in the current
economic climate, that it would be far
better spent at home. Since this comes
from a public that is unimpeachably
generous in the aftermath of natural
disasters, the scepticism seems reserved
for government-administered aid.
Even recipients of aid have expressed a
desire for assistance that has been better
thought through. Paul Kagame, the
president of Rwanda, has argued that
donors need not ‘just the heart for aid,
but the head’.
In this regard, it is refreshing to hear
the new international development
secretary, Andrew Mitchell, calling for
major change in how taxpayers’ money
will be spent on aid. His plan for a new
independent aid watchdog, which will
help ensure value for money, could be a
major step forward in the fight to end
extreme poverty.
But there is a litany of failed hope and
promises from our aid industry’s past. If
the new government is to succeed, they
will need to take resolute and sometimes
painful measures now, which change the
goals and, more importantly, the process
of providing aid.
Where UK aid is spent
Today the UK bilateral aid budget is
disbursed to a wide range of sectors and
projects in over 100 nations. Only a
fraction of this money goes to extremely
poor regions, and a fraction of that to
areas where we have clear scientific
evidence that it could help to reduce
poverty. 
There are numerous studies showing
that improved literacy and numeracy give
children better opportunities in adulthood.
We have also learned that it is possible
dramatically to reduce child deaths in
extremely poor regions through provision
of very basic and inexpensive health
services (Bryce et al, 2005). During the last
parliament, £4.2 billion, 35% of total
bilateral aid, went on health and
education.
According to the Bellagio Child
Survival Study Group, a collection of
international experts on public health and
the causes of child deaths, the annual UK
aid budget would be more than sufficient
to prevent six million child deaths each
year – thus ending most child mortality. At
current costs, the same money could be
used to provide annual primary school
education to 78 million children in
extremely poor regions, who would
otherwise grow up illiterate and missing
basic maths skills.
But aid is spent on many more
dubious, and successful, claimants. During
the last parliament, the UK spent £2.6
billion helping build ‘government and civil
society’ and £1.9 billion on ‘economic
aid’, which refers to items such as budget
All the UK’s major parties agree on ring-fencing foreign aid spending at
current levels, even while the country’s dire financial situation requires
sharp cuts to other budgets. Peter Boone draws on the evidence on aid
effectiveness to argue that our focus should not be on the amount we
spend but rather on making aid work better.
Reforms to make
aid work better
probably require
radical change
Making the 
UK’s aid budget
work better
assistance and infrastructure aimed at
supporting the overall economy.
These projects have laudable goals,
but there is little evidence to prove how,
and whether, they matter to long-term
development or poverty eradication. When
considered as rivals to projects saving lives
or educating children, where we do have
strong evidence of need and benefit, they
are hard to justify. 
When deciding how to invest aid
funds, portfolio theories of asset
management tell us that when comparing
two alternative investments, if one has
greater certainty of a similar return to
another, we should allocate most or even
all funds to the investments where we
have greater understanding of returns. If
we applied these theories to our aid
budget, we would need to reduce radically
many categories of programmes today.
The need for rigorous
assessment
In fact, however we define our objectives
with aid, we quickly face the significant
obstacle that current assessment practices
leave us with little idea of which projects
have worked and which have not.
A typical Department for International
Development (DFID) aid project provides
funds to a government, or through an
NGO, which then administers the project,
spends the funds and reports back on
outcomes. DFID does operate an internal
evaluation group that audits some
projects and concludes whether they were
successful or not. Results are summarised
in DFID reports, for example:
‘The successes of aid are visible.
Thanks to UK aid from DFID, in recent
years three million people have been
vaccinated against measles, over 100,000
teachers have been trained, clean water
has been provided to almost one million
people and 12 million people have been
assisted through food security
programmes.’
Note the exclusive focus on an
accounting of inputs, rather than on
impact measured in terms of
improvements in health or education or
other key outcomes. Input claims can
sound impressive, but experience shows
that, by themselves, they are not.
Teachers participating in training sessions
might – but do not necessarily – lead to
better-educated children.
Even the poorest regions in Africa
typically have some kind of school, and
they probably have a teacher assigned to
them. But the schools often do not
function. The reasons are numerous:
teacher salaries are too small or in arrears;
there are no books, desks, written
materials or classroom visual aids; parents
remove their children from school to work
and look after siblings; or the teacher
simply absconds because there is no
effective supervisory system in place. 
Meaningful assessment must rest on
outcomes not inputs, and for large aid
donors, such outcomes should be the
desired goals, not an intermediate step
along the way. For example, a reasonable
measurement of the value of teacher
training should be pupils’ subsequent
performance in school, rather than a head
count of training session participants.
Similarly, the round number of people
to whom ‘clean water has been provided’
or who ‘have been assisted through food
security’ is less interesting and valuable
than, for example, any resultant changes
in health, measured in disease prevalence,
morbidity or mortality. Are the ‘one
million’ and ‘12 million’ lives measurably
better or not? We should be asking and
answering this question with rigour and
specificity. 
The DFID assessment points to
something else. Specifically, vaccinations
are inexpensive, as are rudimentary
schools, so the lack of these generally
reflects deeper problems. Poor provision of
public services invariably indicates that
extremely poor people, almost by
definition, are politically weak. The best
services go to wealthier urban areas:
children in these areas grow up wealthier,
and they tend to benefit first and
foremost from economic growth.
So if we simply provide more funds to
government budgets, and provide specific
inputs such as the items listed above,
what makes us think that these have lead
to better conditions for the extremely
poor?
In short, to make aid more effective,
we need better evidence on what works
and what doesn’t, and a focus on end
goals instead of inputs. We should ask
DFID to set precise goals for outcomes,
such as improving the school performance
of children in specific rural villages or
reducing mortality rates in specified
regions or raising income opportunities.
They can decide how that is best done,
CentrePiece Summer 2010
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Maintaining the
status quo misses
an opportunity –
both for 
taxpayers, who
remain sceptical
about foreign 
aid, and for
intended
recipients
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but we should never lose sight of the end
goal and always make sure we can
measure it.
Only when goals are set clearly and
outcomes of projects are measured
rigorously against these goals will we have
meaningful data to begin to understand
the impact of what we are doing. It is
encouraging that DFID is increasingly
focusing on measuring effectiveness, as
are other agencies. But there is clearly far
to go in making an evidence-based
approach the exclusive or default one. 
Evidence on aid
effectiveness
These problems of aid allocation are not
unique to the UK. In fact, despite over
five decades of large international aid
programmes, it is very difficult to find
evidence that foreign aid has achieved
much in terms of reducing global poverty.
The nations that have achieved the
most poverty reduction over the last two
or three decades – India and China –
received very little aid relative to their size.
Cross-country studies have repeatedly
shown that nations that received
substantial aid fared no better at growing
or reducing indicators of extreme poverty
than nations that received little aid
(Boone, 1996; Easterly et al, 2004).
We can point to specific successes:
the global coverage of vaccines and the
eradication of smallpox are great
achievements. But these require little
money, and they hardly justify the $100
billion plus global aid budgets, let alone
the UK’s £7.8 billion annual aid budgets.
As DFID itself reports, despite five decades
of spending and efforts: ‘over one billion
people, most of them in sub-Saharan
Africa and South Asia, still live and die in
appalling conditions.’
One study concludes that aid
ineffectiveness might be due to the
deleterious impact of aid on exchange
rates (Rajan and Subramanian, 2005). As
with Dutch disease (where increased
revenues from natural resources drive up
a nation’s exchange rate), large foreign
inflows drive up domestic wages and
prices, so pricing nations out of export
markets. Others have argued that aid
generates rent-seeking and corruption,
which are harmful to growth.
These explanations need careful study,
but they do not prevent well thought out
aid from providing benefits. For example,
aid that serves to improve the productivity
of employees or increases the overall
ability of a population and nation to
compete might be channelled in ways
that avoid or offset corruption and
competitiveness issues.
Aid for extremely 
poor regions
During the next few decades, it is very
likely that many poor nations will
continue to grow more rapidly than
rich nations. Resource-rich Africa
will grow much wealthier as India
and China add what the International
Monetary Fund describes as the equivalent
of one new Europe to global GDP over the
coming decade. 
The growing wealth of many regions
in Africa and Asia should lead to
important changes in how aid is allocated.
Throughout the world, there will be
‘pockets of poverty’, where extreme
poverty persists even when economies are
improving. These will be found in nations
with civil war or regional instability, and in
areas where ethnically distinct or politically
weak populations can be ignored by
national governments.
Residents of these enduring pockets of
poverty will stand to gain the most from
aid. Two reasonable goals, with existing
good evidence backing their value, would
aim to make sure that the next generation
of children can grow up educated, and the
communities live with decent, basic
healthcare.
This would mean mapping out the
regions where we think poverty will
persist, and orienting aid, for example,
towards ‘permitting the 10 million people
in these communities to access basic
health and education.’ Or we could work
on income-generating programmes to
help residents of these regions out of
extreme poverty.
The approach could be a package of
measures combining steps to achieve
specific outcomes that can be quantified
and hence measured, for example: income
levels, numeracy/literacy test scores,
disease incidence, mortality rates, etc. The 
key is to make clear goals and measurable
outcomes our mantra.
Lessons from 
medical science 
In the early days of modern
medicine, practitioners used
A major
expenditure
review is 
needed: new
non-emergency
aid projects
should be halted
until it is
completed
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traditional and experimental treatments
without the benefit of testing and the data
it generates, which could have determined
which treatments actually worked, which
had no effect and which were actually
harmful. Similarly, today in our aid
budgets, we have a plethora of
‘treatments’, most of which sound
promising. But for most of them, there
have been no serious evaluations and we
thus have no idea what actually works. 
Over the past century, techniques were
honed to understand the real (as opposed
to merely apparent) effects of medical
treatments in both surrogate and human
populations. There has been some attempt
to apply these approaches by economists
and others interested in the impact of
specific ‘treatments’ used as aid. The
Poverty Action Lab at MIT has led the
implementation of such techniques in
economics.
For an aid programme, it can be simple
to introduce rigorous measurement similar
to that used in the field of medicine. We
first define our goals as specifically and
clearly as possible. Then we design a
programme that allows us to measure the
effect of the activities we undertake to
reach the goal.
The third essential element is an
independent, objective monitoring team
responsible for measuring outcomes. If the
same rigour in measuring effectiveness of
drugs and healthcare had been applied to
the aid industry, we would surely know
much more about what works and what
doesn’t today. 
There is a case for these methods
adopted from medical drug trials to be
used not only for research, but also for
measuring the impact of aid projects in
progress when it is feasible. The logic of
this is simple: while in the private sector
we can measure outcome by profits, with
foreign aid we need to find alternative
means of rigorously assessing outcomes.
Based on our own experimental work,
we believe it is both feasible and highly
valuable to introduce such techniques – or
techniques developed by economists and
epidemiologists which are nearly as
rigorous – to understand better whether
individual projects actually succeed.
Measuring outcomes, not
counting inputs
Together with the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and the UK-
based charity Effective Intervention, CEP
has embarked on several aid projects in
India and Africa that aim to improve
children’s education and health in
extremely poor regions. In each case we
pick major outcome goals – such as
reducing child mortality rates or raising
child literacy rates – and then work with
local partners, clinicians, other relevant
experts and medical statisticians to design
projects that will achieve these goals at
reasonable cost. 
These projects are not research – our
goal is to improve education and health in
a manner that can be expanded across
much larger populations – but they have
been designed like medical trials: we have
randomised the initial allocation of services
to villages so that we can compare
outcomes across treatment and control
villages during the initial stages of the
project, before expanding if it is successful.
Randomisation across communities as
we roll out programmes, so that some
receive project assistance earlier than
others, allows us to isolate the effect of
our aid project so it is not confused with
the effects of other changes that may be
affecting the region. We have also created
independent monitoring teams, which
regularly visit households to collect
information on child mortality and test
children’s outcomes for literacy and
numeracy. This gives us a detailed
understanding of what is working and
what is not. 
Today our projects employ 1,300
people in India and Africa, and we are
providing services to approximately
500,000 people. On a monthly basis, we
provide antenatal care to 8,000 women,
and we provide drugs and basic services to
1,500 sick children. During this year, we
will be testing 15,000 children in India and
Africa for literacy and numeracy, as part of
a programme to understand current levels
and aim for improvements.
We could list many more figures, but
they do not tell us anything about success.
Our experience has made us fully aware of
all the pitfalls of counting mere inputs. In
our health projects in West Africa, we still
find alarmingly high numbers of child
deaths. This is despite intensive training
both for parents on diseases that cause
child deaths and for village health workers
on how to treat simple diseases, plus free
provision of medicines and twice monthly
visits by trained nurses.
If aid were spent
well, current
funding levels
would be more
than adequate
and lower levels
not inconceivable
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We cannot honestly claim to have
achieved much at this stage. We are still
waiting for our independent research team
to assess results and comparisons with
control villages. But it is already clear that
the intensive nature of disease, and the
isolation of these communities, means that
more needs to be done, probably over
many years, to reach our objective of
lowering the level of child mortality. 
Our education projects have also
begun to yield critical information about
how to design aid if the objective is to
raise educational levels. We are completing
a national survey of literacy and numeracy
in remote regions of Guinea-Bissau ahead
of a major project to improve these
indicators.
The preliminary data are showing us
that while schools exist on paper, they
simply do not function. We find the same
in tribal regions of India where we work:
enrolment ratios are very high, but children
do not attend and therefore do not learn.
A whole generation of children is growing
up illiterate and innumerate. 
In Guinea-Bissau, the communities very
much want functioning schools, frequently
pooling resources to build a mud-brick
schoolroom and pay a teacher’s salary.
Virtually nothing more is provided by a
central government that prefers to devote
over 30% of its budget to the military.
Despite being one of the poorest regions
of the world, very little aid money reaches
Guinea-Bissau and when it does the
impact is just too small to make any
difference. 
Making aid more effective
We’ve argued that there is good reason to
think that aid can achieve a lot to reduce
extreme poverty, and the amounts that we
currently spend are more than enough to
make major inroads.
But today there is not enough evidence
to convince sceptical observers that aid
money achieves what it ought to, and
evidence from the past generally suggests
the bulk of our aid money has failed to do
much to achieve poverty reduction. This is
a failure that both taxpayers and the
intended recipients need to see change. 
The new government has an
opportunity, as President Kagame suggests,
to apply hard-headed thinking so as to
make aid more effective. We believe the
following policies would make sense with
this goal in mind:
 A multidisciplinary group should be
formed to determine what our goals for
aid should be for the next decade and
what specific evidence we have on how
we can achieve those goals. To
demonstrate the renewed focus on making
aid work and using taxpayers’ money only
when we can be confident it is spent well,
all new non-emergency aid projects should
be halted while this process is underway. 
 We must set clear goals and select and
design aid projects around them. Such
goals could be lofty – such as reducing
extreme poverty in a region of 10 million
people – but they need to be specific
enough to measure and monitor. During
the design stages of all aid projects, we
should plan how we will measure and
monitor the effects of what we do in 
the most rigorous manner feasible from
the start. 
 We need to generate an objective
mentality among our project staff,
especially the evaluation departments.
These need to look forward to learning
both the positive conclusions, and the
negative conclusions, that rigorous
measurement will teach us.
Peter Boone is a research associate in CEP’s
globalisation programme and chairman of
Effective Intervention (http://www.effint.org),
a charity based in the UK.
Half of DFID’s
bilateral aid
budget is spent
in areas where
there is little
evidence that it
will do much to
reduce poverty
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Like many emerging economies, Mexico faces the challenge
of how to position itself to compete more effectively in
international markets. A key issue is the quality of the skills
of the labour force – and in increasingly knowledge-based
economies, it is not just the skills of the typical worker that
matter, but also the skills of the most highly skilled. 
It is not always appropriate to make comparisons between
economic ‘competition’ and athletic ‘competition’, since a
country can make every citizen richer (a good thing!) and
still fall down the international rankings if other countries
do the same but more quickly. We still think that the
football World Cup is a useful metaphor in this case
because:
 First, in the World Cup, global competitiveness matters
as it stacks players of different countries up against each
other on a level playing field. While victory in any given
league is relative, players can be the best in a local league
without being very good.
 Second, in the World Cup, it is not the average quality
of the players that matters: it is the very upper tail – the
best of the best. The quality of the players in the upper
tail depends not just on the average of the distribution,
but also on how it is shaped – for example, whether it is
skewed towards higher performers.
 Third, simple mathematics suggests that the absolute
quality of the players depends in part on the size of the
pool from which they are drawn.
Every boy in Mexico believes that they are in the running
to be picked for the World Cup (known there as the
Mundial). But can the same be said for the economic
World Cup: does every child really believe they have a
shot at rising to be the best of the best economically?
Internationally comparable measures, such as the OECD’s
Program for International Student Assessment (PISA),
indicate that Mexico’s educational performance is below
that of many other OECD countries. What has been less
explored is the consequence of that for the absolute
number of very highly skilled.
CentrePiece Summer 2010
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Producing superstars 
for the economic World Cup
Most countries’ education policies make raising average student
performance their priority. Yet just as in the football World Cup, the
quality of the top performers is the key to competing successfully at the
global level. Lant Pritchett and Martina Viarengo explore this
challenge in the particular context of policy-making in Mexico.
Competing in the
knowledge-based
global economy
requires encouraging
better performance
among the top
performers
in brief...
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Our research examines how many students Mexico
produces per year above the ‘high international
benchmark’ of the PISA in mathematics. (The benchmark
is related to the score of 625 and above, where the
OECD average is equal to 500 and the standard deviation
is equal to 100.) We find that out of a cohort of roughly
two million 15-year-old students, Mexico produces only
between 3,500 and 6,000 students per year above the
benchmark.
The comparable number for the United States, where the
educational performance of high school students is
widely lamented, is a quarter of a million. In South Korea
(a country whose population is half the size of Mexico’s),
it is 125,000. And even India, which in general has a
much lower average performance, produces over
100,000 high performance mathematics students per
year. The issue is not about mathematics per se: similar
findings are likely to hold in other subjects. 
By comparing differences in performance at the very top,
we also find that the top Mexican students lag behind:
they achieve a level that is only middling in better
performing countries. Moreover, only a very small number
of students are ready to go into higher education and
compete globally. Rankings of universities indicate that
the low quality of Mexican secondary schools is not
overcome at higher levels of education.
We then review the effect of some of Mexico’s traditional
education policies, such as Carrera Magisterial, a
performance-based pay bonus for teachers introduced in
1992 to modernise primary schooling. The reform
replaced the five-year seniority teacher pay scale with a
new pay structure weighted by improvements in
students’ performance (which represented 20% of the
total weight). It also allowed principals to receive awards
based on their schools’ overall performance
Empirically, a small positive but statistically insignificant
effect has been found on students’ average performance.
This may be partly due to the weak incentives faced by
teachers and the significant role played by unions in
determining the final teachers’ pay improvements
We relate the effect of these policies to the distribution
of test scores in Mexico. We observe that even in the
‘best-case scenario’, policies that appear to have a
considerable effect on students’ achievement would lead
to a modest gain in the average score, and only to a
small increase in the number of global high performers. 
What new policies should be pursued to position Mexico
to compete internationally? We identify three areas:
 First, the focus should be on encouraging better
performance among the top performers. To be able to
produce high-end ‘ideas’, Mexico must be able to
compete with leading countries like the United States and
Israel. The country needs a critical mass of people of high
ability to produce ideas and innovate.
 Second, there needs to be an emphasis on broadening
the base of talent across socio-economic groups. Mexican
education is currently stratified by income and ability to
pay rather than by talent and ability to learn. The country
must stop recruiting from a narrow base; instead, it
should actively identify and encourage academic
excellence among those who are not currently well off.
 Third, creating a conducive environment for
entrepreneurship so that new ideas can flourish should be
a priority. If institutions do not encourage private initiative,
social mobility and productive activities, talented people
will choose occupations that do not face competition and
which are often socially unproductive.
There may be many benefits to traditional policies that
focus on improving the average quality of the educational
system. But our research suggests that they are unlikely 
to make Mexico competitive in the knowledge-based
global economy.
Instead, what is needed is a combined focus on expanding
educational opportunities for all and encouraging the
upper tail of top performers. Many other countries could
no doubt learn from this challenge of producing
superstars for the economic World Cup.
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This article summarises ‘Producing Superstars for the
Economic Mundial: The Mexican Predicament with Quality of
Education’ by Lant Pritchett and Martina Viarengo, chapter 2.5
in The Mexico Competitiveness Report 2009, edited by Ricardo
Hausmann, Emilio Lozoya Austin and Irene Mia and published
by the World Economic Forum
(http://www.weforum.org/pdf/Mexico/MCR_2009.pdf).
Lant Pritchett is professor of the practice of international
development at the Harvard Kennedy School. Martina
Viarengo is a research officer in CEP’s education and skills
programme.
It is not just the skills of the typical
worker that matter, but also the
skills of the most highly skilled
CentrePiece Summer 2010
The European Commission iscurrently finalising the designof the third trading phase ofthe European Union’s (EU)
Emissions Trading System (ETS), which will
begin in January 2013 and last until 2020.
A key concern will be any potentially
negative effects on the competitiveness 
of affected businesses. But the
Commission’s stated objective is to
increase the share of emission permits that
are auctioned rather than allocated for
free to ‘vulnerable’ industries.
Without doubt, increasing the amount
of auctioned permits would improve 
the system’s fairness. The current practice
of allocating free permits on the basis of
past emissions effectively rewards
businesses that have been lagging behind
in reducing emissions.
Auctioning permits also provides
additional revenue for governments to pay
for research and development (R&D) and
infrastructure investments required for the
transition to a low-carbon economy. The
auction revenue could further be used to
compensate people on low incomes in the
event that carbon pricing has regressive
distributional effects or simply to help
balance strained government budgets. 
The European Commission plans to tighten the
greenhouse gas emissions targets in the Emissions
Trading System. Ralf Martin and colleagues examine
the likely impact on affected businesses, and conclude
that industry is exploiting concerns about
competitiveness to obtain free emission permits
according to criteria that are too lax.
Europe’s emissions
trading scheme:
taxpayers versus the industry lobby
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Where the Emission Trading
System is going wrong
The proposed design of the third phase of
the ETS includes criteria to determine
which industrial sectors should continue to
receive free permits. Under these criteria,
147 sectors – more than half of the 
258 manufacturing sectors under
consideration – will be eligible for free
permits, despite the fact that not all of
these sectors include firms that are
regulated by the ETS.
This follows pressure from industry
groups claiming that more stringent carbon
pricing will provoke job losses and cause
carbon-intensive production to relocate
outside the EU – a process referred to as
‘carbon leakage’. 
Our research asks whether the
proposed criteria for exemption from
auctioning are appropriate. Do they
capture the risk of downsizing or plant
closure? And what are the implications in
terms of job losses, carbon leakage and
emissions?
Our analysis is based on data from
almost 800 interviews with managers in
manufacturing plants – both members and
non-members of the ETS – in six EU
countries (Belgium, France, Germany,
Hungary, Poland and the UK).
Each firm is rated on a scale from 1 to
5 as to the likelihood and degree of
downsizing in response to future climate
policy, with a score of 1 corresponding to
no expected response and a score of 5
indicating a high likelihood that the firm
will close down or relocate. The results of
the analysis are as follows:
First, a complete relocation in response
to carbon pricing is highly unlikely.
Among the principal manufacturing
industries we sampled, none of the
‘average’ firms are at risk of relocation or
closure (see Figure 1). There is only one
sector (Other Minerals) out of 14 where
the average score is slightly above 3,
implying downsizing by at least 10% of
employment or output. In no case does the
95% confidence band include the
maximum score of 5 (closure). 
5
4
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Notes: Each three-digit industry is represented by one green and one red
point. The horizontal axis measures for red points normalised carbon
intensity (VaS) and for green points normalised trade intensity (TI). The
vertical axis measures the downsizing risk score derived from the interviews
with managers. The two lines represent the fitted values for each set of points.
Figure 2:
Correlation between downsizing risk and intensity measures 
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Notes: The bars show the sector-level average score measuring the risk of
downsizing as a consequence of climate policy. The lines represent the
confidence bands, calculated at the 95% level.
Figure 1:
Average risk of downsizing due to more stringent 
carbon policy’ 
The Emissions Trading
System is accommodating
the interests of the
industry lobby too
generously at the expense
of European taxpayers
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Second, the Commission’s 
assessment criteria are flawed. 
The Commission bases its assessment of
sectors at risk of carbon leakage on two
statistics – the carbon intensity (which is
measured as the amount of carbon a
sector emits divided by its value added;
what is usually referred to as Value at
Stake, VaS); and the trade intensity (TI),
which the Commission defines as the
value of imports and exports to non-EU
countries over the total market size of the
sector within the EU.
We examine how well these statistics
capture downsizing risk by correlating
them with our score. Plotting sectoral
carbon and trade intensities against
downsizing risk scores reveals that carbon
intensity is strongly correlated with
downsizing risk, but trade intensity is not
(see Figure 2).
Using the trade intensity criterion to
determine which sectors should be exempt
from auctioning is therefore likely to result
in exemptions for firms that are not at all
at risk of downsizing or carbon leakage.
Free permit allocation in this instance is
simply a transfer of taxpayers’ money to
industry without any additional social
benefit – this money should be reclaimed.
Third, up to 88% of manufacturing 
sector emissions are exempt from
regulation under the proposed
thresholds for the ETS. 
The thresholds proposed by the
Commission implicitly define three groups
of exempted sectors, depicted as the
rectangles A, B and C in Figure 3.
Strikingly, group B contains a particularly
heterogeneous group of industries. 
80
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Figure 3:
Value at stake and trade intensity of sectors 
in the interview sample   
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Notes: The figure plots the position of the sectors included in our interview sample in
terms of the two criteria proposed for exempting sectors from auctioning of permits.
The size of the circles is proportional to the number of firms in a given four-digit
industry (NACE 1.1 classification). The rectangles A, B and C represent the three sets
of eligible sectors defined by the Commission’s thresholds for the two criteria. The
solid lines show mean trade and carbon intensities, and the dotted lines represent the
respective employment-weighted means.
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Figure 4:
Impact measures across ‘at risk’ groups 
Notes: The bars represent, for each set of firms as described on the horizontal axis,
the average score measuring the risk of downsizing as a consequence of climate
policy. The lines represent the confidence bands, calculated at the 95% level.
Most industry sectors
entitled to free emission
permits would not close
or relocate outside of
the EU if they had to
pay for permits
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There are a large number of industries
with very low carbon intensity as well as a
few sectors with moderate carbon
intensity. We thus further subdivide this
group by carbon intensity and analyse the
following four subgroups:
 Group A with carbon intensity (VaS)
greater than 30%.
 Group B with moderate carbon
intensity, depicted as Group B & VaS>5%.
This group has trade intensity (TI) greater
than 30% and carbon intensity between
5% and 30%.
 Group B with high trade intensity
(>30%) but low carbon intensity (<5%),
depicted by Group B & VaS<5%. 
 Group C with moderate trade and
carbon intensity (5%<VaS<30% and
10%<TI<30%).
Figure 4 plots the average downsizing risk
and associated 95% confidence bands for
these groups. Only carbon-intensive firms
(Group A) and the more carbon-intensive
among the trade-intensive firms (Group B
& VaS>5%) are at high risk of outsourcing
a significant part of their production – 
but even then the downsizing is only
around 10%.
How to save €7 billion 
If the Commission’s exemption criteria
were to exclude only these two groups 
(A and B & VaS>5%) from permit
auctioning, the amount of permits
auctioned would increase considerably
without aggravating the overall risk of job
losses and carbon leakage. 
This could be achieved by modifying
the thresholds for the third phase of EU
emissions trading as follows. Only sectors
with a carbon intensity higher than 30%
or sectors with both trade intensity greater
than 10% and carbon intensity of more
than 5% should be granted an exemption.
This modification would revoke the
exemptions currently envisaged for Groups
C and B & VaS<5%. By a conservative
estimate, this would provide additional
revenue for European governments of at
least €7 billion annually.
Changing criteria moving
forward
We find no evidence that the trade
intensity criterion reliably measures the risk
of downsizing or closure across sectors.
The Commission should therefore replace
this criterion in the longer run with one
that more accurately reflects a sector’s
vulnerability to carbon leakage.
The trade intensity measure potentially
misses an important aspect that
determines vulnerability – namely
‘locational specificity’. The more strongly a
firm benefits from factors that are specific
to the EU – such as the skill set of the
workforce, agglomeration economies, the
stability of institutions, etc. – the less likely
it is to shift production abroad in response
to EU climate change policy. Nevertheless,
more research into the measurement of
locational specificity is needed before this
concept can be implemented. 
Conclusion 
Despite many design improvements, there
is a concern that even in the third phase
of the ETS, the Commission is
accommodating the interests of the
industry lobby too generously – at the
expense of European taxpayers. 
But there is still a window of
opportunity for European governments to
improve the design of the ETS while
raising additional income of €7 billion
annually. 
Rather than providing an unspecific
subsidy for industry, this money could be
earmarked to finance investments and
R&D crucial for the transition to a low-
carbon economy. It could equally be used
to mitigate the possibly regressive effects
of higher carbon prices on low-income
groups. Finally, it could help to balance
strained government budgets in the wake
of the financial crisis.
Further reading
Barry Anderson, Jörg Leib, Ralf Martin, Marty
McGuigan, Mirabelle Muûls, Laure de Preux
and Ulrich Wagner (2010) ’Climate Change
Policy and Business in Europe — Evidence
from Interviewing Managers’, forthcoming
CEP Discussion Paper.
Removing the exemptions in 
the Emissions Trading System
would raise €7 billion annually
This article summarises ‘Still Time to Reclaim
the European Union Emissions Trading
System for the Taxpayer’, a CEP policy
briefing by Ralf Martin, Mirabelle Muûls and
Ulrich Wagner (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/
download/pa010.pdf).
Ralf Martin is a research economist at CEP.
Mirabelle Muûls is a research associate in
CEP’s globalisation programme and at the
Grantham Institute for Climate Change at
Imperial College London. Ulrich Wagner is at
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and is a
research associate in CEP’s productivity and
innovation programme.
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Two-footed
professional
footballers are
able to
appropriate 
the rents 
from their 
scarce talent
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This article summarises ‘The Returns to Scarce Talent:
Footedness and Player Remuneration in European Soccer’ 
by Alex Bryson, Bernd Frick and Rob Simmons, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 948 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0948.pdf).
Alex Bryson of the National Institute of Economic and Social
Research is a visiting research fellow in CEP’s labour markets
programme. Bernd Frick is at the University of Paderborn.
Rob Simmons is at Lancaster University Management School.
The wage premium 
of two-footed footballers
There is widespread public concern that some workers –
chiefly senior executives in ‘bailed out’ banks – are reaping
huge financial rewards for what appears to be very poor
performance. The retort is that these highly paid
executives are simply being paid their market worth and
that attempts to pay them less could lead to lack of
motivation and increased likelihood that the best will leave
for better opportunities elsewhere.
The debate is familiar to those with knowledge of sports
economics. Some professional sports in the United States,
notably American football and ice hockey, have team
payrolls that are heavily regulated in a salary cap
arrangement. As yet it is not wholly clear what the impact
of these rules and regulations is on incentives, individual
performance and team performance.
In Europe, where there is a long tradition of not
interfering in professional athletes’ wages, earnings can
be very substantial. Professional footballers in particular
earn considerable amounts of money in the form of
endorsements and sponsorship, but also from their wages.
If you ask supporters whether the players in their team
deserve what they earn, some will say nobody deserves to
earn £x more than the person in the street (the argument
levelled at bankers, traders and the like), but most will say:
‘it all depends on how they perform on the field’.
There’s the rub. How do we really know whether players
receive a wage that is equivalent to their marginal
productivity? We may know what they have been doing
on the pitch – how many passes they made, how many
goals they scored, how many appearances they made –
and this clearly helps. But we have more than that: a
variable that really identifies a rare talent that teams are
very likely to pay for. That is two-footedness.
Two-footedness is the ability to use both feet equally well
to pass, tackle and shoot. Unsurprisingly, this versatility is
strongly related to player performance. Furthermore, it is a
fairly unusual talent – only around one sixth of players in
the top five European leagues are two-footed.
It seems that two-footedness can be taught. Indeed, Tom
Finney, a famous English forward of the 1950s who
taught himself to use both feet, is cited as the inspiration
for an institution set up in the UK in 2004, which claims
to be ‘the first and original soccer school that
concentrates solely on improving the other foot’.
But this training of two-footedness is something that can
only be properly developed at an early age in the
formative years of a player’s career, and it is difficult to
instil in today’s established professional players. Hence, we
can treat footedness as a pre-determined specialist ability
that is capable of generating a return.
Does this talent translate into wages? The answer is ‘yes’.
There is a raw premium of over 60% relative to right-
footed players, which falls to around 40% controlling for
demographic characteristics, position in the team and the
team’s ability to pay players. It falls by half to around 20%
when controlling for other performance measures, but
remains at around 20% with all these controls. And it
remains large even within teams.
This is strong evidence of a clear link between
performance and wages among professional football
players. But is there anything in it for teams? Are they
able to appropriate any of the returns to employing 
two-footed players? In an efficient labour market, where
players are free to move (as they have been since the
Bosman ruling in the European Court of Justice in 
1995), players should be able to hold onto their hard-
earned cash.
Our empirical evidence seems to confirm this. Having
controlled for other relevant factors, such as total payroll,
the proportion of two-footed players in a team does not
significantly affect the number of points the team gets at
the end of the season. It seems that two-footed players
are able to appropriate the rents from their scarce talent.
The study of football – the clubs, the players, the managers, the referees
– is telling us more and more about the operation of labour markets and
incentives. Here, Alex Bryson and colleagues show that two-footedness
– the rare ability to use both feet equally well to pass, tackle and shoot –
commands a large wage premium.
in brief...
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n December 2009, a Ministerial
meeting was concluded at the
World Trade Organisation (WTO).
The headlines typically read
something like ‘Ministers reaffirm
the need and their desire to conclude the
Doha Round by the end of next year’. For
many observers, this was a case of déjà
vu: since the current round of multilateral
trade negotiations began in 2001, there
have been numerous promises that it
would be concluded in the ‘near term’
and time and again, those expectations
have been frustrated.
The main concern with the seemingly
endless delay in achieving a new
agreement is that such a failure could
lead to a protectionist backlash. Like
riding a bike, the argument goes, if you
don’t move forward, you fall over.
Fears of a retreat to protectionism
became particularly intense after the
onset of the financial crisis – if the road
gets bumpier, then you really have to
push forward to avoid falling. As it turns
out, there has been only a very limited
retreat towards protectionism, even
though the WTO bike has not been
moving forward.
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There has been a proliferation of regional
trade agreements around the world since the
early 1990s. In a survey of the latest theoretical
and empirical research on regionalism,
Caroline Freund and Emanuel Ornelas ask
whether we should celebrate or be concerned
about this trend.
Regionalism has become
and will probably remain
the preferred form of
reciprocal liberalisation
for most countries
Regional trade 
agreements:
blessing or burden?
Still, even if the lack of progress in
multilateral talks does not imply a retreat,
many observers remain worried. After all,
if there are gains to be shared with
further liberalisation, we should make
sure we don’t waste the opportunity.
While this view is correct, it must be
noted that lack of progress in the
multilateral arena does not imply that the
world is not becoming more integrated. In
fact, governments across the globe are as
active as ever in negotiating new trade
agreements. The difference is that the
agreements are not multilateral but
‘regional’.
In 2009, for example, 25 new regional
trade agreements (RTAs) were notified to
the WTO. The agreements include
developed as well as developing
countries, and involve countries from
most parts of the world. In fact, they are
not always regional, increasingly
encompassing members from different
continents.
The new agreements bring the total
number of RTAs in force to nearly 300. In
the same period, the WTO also received
notification of 14 other RTAs that are
currently being negotiated or about to
enter into force. The WTO estimates that
there are around 100 other agreements
currently at this stage (WTO, 2009).
Should we celebrate the expansion of
RTAs, or should we be concerned with
this trend, which seems to be only
accelerating since it took off in the early
1990s? In a survey of the theoretical and
empirical literature on regionalism, we
conclude that although countries should
approach regionalism with care, to date
RTAs have been more of a blessing than a
burden for the multilateral trading system.
Assessing the impact 
of RTAs
To understand the impact of RTAs, it is
important first to recognise that they are
intrinsically different from both
multilateral liberalisation (under the aegis
of the WTO) and unilateral liberalisation.
In both of those cases, countries lower
trade barriers on all sources of imports of
a good by exactly the same extent.
In contrast, under an RTA, tariffs fall
on imports from the other members of
the agreement, but they need not change
on imports from non-members. As a
result, RTAs imply both trade liberalisation
and trade discrimination. Whereas there is
a near-consensus among economists that
the former is desirable, that is not true for
the latter.
Trade liberalisation within a trading
bloc tends to be beneficial when it
promotes a shift of resources from
inefficient domestic suppliers to more
efficient producers within the region.
Economists call this phenomenon 
‘trade creation’.
Conversely, a trading bloc is likely to
be harmful if it generates a shift of
resources from efficient external
producers to inefficient producers within
the region. This is a consequence of trade
discrimination, which economists call
‘trade diversion’.
In principle, either trade creation or
trade diversion can prevail within an RTA.
There are theoretical arguments that
support the primacy of each effect under
similar circumstances. Thus, in the 
end, which effect dominates is an
empirical matter.
Unfortunately, estimating trade
creation and trade diversion is no easy
task. It requires knowledge of the
counterfactual: what would have
happened to trade if there were no trade
agreement? As this is unknown,
assumptions must be made.
A variety of approaches have been
employed. While results inevitably vary
depending on the methodology employed
(as well as the time period, the trading
bloc in question and the level of
aggregation in the data), at least two
general messages arise from the large set
of studies investigating trade creation and
trade diversion in RTAs around the world:
 First, trade creation tends to be the
norm in RTAs – and trade diversion is the
exception.
 Second, when trade diversion is
observed, its magnitudes are normally
relatively small.
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To date,
regionalism has
been more a
blessing than a
burden for the
multilateral
trading system
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benefit (and support the agreement)
because of the better access to foreign
markets, whereas purely domestic firms
suffer from the tougher competition from
the RTA partners.
But this also weakens the domestic
firms’ stance on protection against non-
members. The reason is that the free
access to the domestic market enjoyed by
the partners’ exporters under the RTA
lowers the market share of the domestic
industry. As a result, the RTA makes any
price increase generated by a higher tariff
less valuable for the domestic industry:
now whenever the government attempts
to help domestic producers through higher
external tariffs, the partners’ producers
absorb part of that surplus.
In other words, the RTA creates
‘leakage’ in the trade policy redistributive
channel. External protection also becomes
more costly, because of the trade diversion
that accompanies the RTA. As a result,
external tariffs tend to fall after the
formation of an RTA both because the
economic marginal cost of external
protection rises and because the political-
economy marginal gain from external
protection falls.
For developing countries, empirical
research supports this rationale because
trade preferences tend to lead to lower
external tariffs. Results for the United
States and the European Union (EU),
however, indicate that they are less likely
to reduce external tariffs on goods where
preferences are offered (see Limao, 2006).
But since the tariffs of both the United
States and the EU are very low to start
with, and cannot be raised because of
their WTO commitments, there is not
much room for change anyway.
Are RTAs welcome?
The benign view that trade creation
dominates trade diversion does not imply
that RTAs are necessarily welcome. In fact,
some commentators argue that the
multilateral negotiations at the WTO are
stuck because RTAs are spreading. Their
basic argument suggests that
governments’ resources are scarce, so if
officials are busy negotiating bilateral
Trade creation versus 
trade diversion
Why is there such a dominance of trade
creation over trade diversion? The answer
is in two parts. First, governments seem to
be choosing their RTA partners well. For
example, variables that suggest greater
gains from a bilateral RTA (such as
proximity between the members, a
similarity in their GDPs and a large
difference in their factor endowments) are
also sharp predictors of whether the two
countries actually have a common RTA
(Baier and Bergstrand, 2004).
Second, when countries form an RTA,
their governments not only lower tariffs
vis-à-vis their RTA partners, as they are
supposed to do; they also bring down the
trade barriers on imports from countries
outside the bloc. This is not part of the
agreement, so governments liberalise
externally because they choose to do so –
and without any type of reciprocity from
the favoured non-members of the bloc.
There is increasing evidence of
external trade liberalisation following an
RTA, especially in developing countries.
(See, for example, Estevadeordal et al,
2008, for an analysis of how Latin
American countries changed their import
tariffs on non-members after forming or
expanding their trade ties during the
1990s.) The lower external tariffs 
provide a double blessing: they imply that
RTAs are responsible for more trade
liberalisation than they mandate
(amplifying trade creation) and for less
trade discrimination than might be
expected (limiting trade diversion).
At first, it may seem odd that
governments, pressured by special
interests as they are virtually everywhere,
would voluntarily lower their external
tariffs without any compensation 
from the favoured countries. But it does
make sense.
Suppose that domestic special interest
groups pressure the government and
induce it to set relatively high tariffs,
which allow the domestic industry to
maintain high prices and enjoy a large
market share. If subsequently the country
enters into a RTA, export-oriented firms
Regional trade
agreements
generally seem
to amplify trade
creation and
limit trade
diversion
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agreements, they will be unable to focus
on more evolving multilateral negotiations.
Others put forward more elaborate
arguments. For example, it is possible that
RTAs may create rents to some groups.
Once well entrenched, these groups may
be able to block further liberalisation
initiatives that would destroy such rents.
On the other hand, there are
arguments indicating that the opposite
may be true. A simple one is that
negotiating RTAs helps officials to develop
the expertise and the frameworks to
implement international trade agreements,
and these could be useful at subsequent
WTO negotiations. Moreover, RTAs also
destroy rents in parts of
the economy. If the rent-
holders who lose with RTAs were the
ones slowing down multilateral talks,
then RTAs can actually provide a boost to
such negotiations.
These and related arguments
constitute an intellectually engaging
debate, but which of them dominate?
When faced with opposing theoretical
results, the solution is typically to scrutinise
the divergent predictions empirically. The
problem here is that the nature of the
question – whether regionalism helps or
hinders multilateralism – does not lend
itself easily to testing.
Simply put, at any point in time we
observe a single realisation of WTO
negotiations. Would they have been any
faster, or easier, had there been fewer (or
more) RTAs? This is a very difficult
question. Consequently, to date empirical
scrutiny has not been able to help us
distinguish good (that is, empirically
relevant) from bad (empirically
inconsequential) theories.
Hence, to the extent that we can
measure, the increasing wave of
regionalism has been largely beneficial to
the world trading system. Most empirical
analyses indicate that trade creation, not
trade diversion, is the norm, both because
governments choose well when forming
RTAs and because they adjust other 
trade policies to moderate the distortions
from discrimination.
Although it is possible that regionalism
could endanger multilateralism, 
at the moment we just do not know.
Since regionalism has become and will
probably remain the preferred form of
reciprocal liberalisation for most countries,
no matter what we economists say,
henceforth we should focus on ways to
integrate regionalism with multilateralism
more effectively.
This article summarises ‘Regional Trade
Agreements’ by Caroline Freund and
Emanuel Ornelas, CEP Discussion Paper 
No. 961 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0961.pdf) and forthcoming in the 
Annual Review of Economics 2: 139-67
(September 2010).
Caroline Freund is at the World Bank.
Emanuel Ornelas is a reader in LSE’s
management department and a research
associate in CEP’s globalisation programme.
Further reading
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(2004) ‘Economic Determinants of Free
Trade Agreements’, Journal of
International Economics 64: 29-63.
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Emanuel Ornelas (2008) ‘Does Regionalism
Affect Trade Liberalization towards 
Non-members?’, Quarterly Journal of
Economics 123: 1531-75.
Nuno Limao (2006) ‘Preferential Trade
Agreements as Stumbling Blocks for
Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Evidence
for the US’, American Economic Review 96:
896-914.
WTO, World Trade Organisation (2009)
‘Overview of Developments in the
International Trading Environment,’
document WT/TPR/OV/12
(http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/
news09_e/wt_tpr_ov_12_a_e.doc).
With regionalism here to
stay, economists should
focus on ways of
integrating it more
effectively with
multilateralism
CentrePiece Summer 2010
20
Men in black:
the impact of new contracts on
football referees’ performance
Until the introduction of salary contracts in the early 2000s,
all referees in English professional football were paid a
match fee for each game they officiated. The change was
introduced to ‘professionalise’ the top tier of refereeing.
The new contracts offered greater income security to
referees. Under the match fee system, referees could be
dropped from the list of officials immediately following a
poor performance, whereas the salary contracts were
initially renewable after two years (and subsequently
renewable annually).
The salaries also offered considerably more money 
than match fees. In return, salaried referees were
required to attend fortnightly off-the-job training sessions
to improve their fitness and ability to make the right
decisions on the pitch.
The introduction of salary contracts was motivated by the
huge growth in revenues resulting from lucrative television
deals and by the increasing scrutiny of referees' decisions
in the media and among fans. The employer – the
Professional Game Match Officials Board – was intent on
driving up standards through salary contracts.
Economic theory suggests that the employer could be
doing the right thing. A classic review of research on
incentives and worker performance notes that when a
worker is paid a salary, ‘despite the fact that there is no
immediate relation between pay and performance, he is
likely to have incentives to exert effort because good
performance will improve future contracts. Such
reputational concerns imply that effort exertion can occur
without explicit pay-for-performance contracts’
(Prendergast, 1999).
The introduction of high paying contracts could also have a
second impact, attracting better quality workers. Theory
suggests that the result will be some ‘sorting’ of workers,
in which better ones seek out the salary contracts and 
less able workers remain on match fees or leave the
occupation entirely.
Our research takes advantage of the fact that when salary
contracts were introduced, referees officiating in the
Championship – the second tier of English professional
football – continued to be paid match fees. This gives us a
‘natural experiment’, in which some workers move to
salary contracts and others continue to be paid under the
old system.
By comparing the relative performance of referees in the
Premier League and Championship in the pre-salary period
with their relative performance in the post-salary period (a
method known as difference-in-differences), we can
estimate the impact of the salary contracts.
This approach would be problematic if Premier League
referees remained in the top tier throughout and thus
obtained salaries, while Championship officials remained
In the 2001/02 English football season, referees of Premier League
matches were paid a salary for the first time. Alex Bryson and
colleagues investigate the impact on their performance.
in brief...
The number of
yellow and red
cards referees
issue in a game is
a good measure of
their performance
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on match fees in the second tier throughout. But this is
not what happened. All referees in both divisions became
eligible for the new contracts, and some referees
officiated in both divisions at various points.
There are two other concerns that might affect our ability
to draw inferences about the impact of salaries on
referees’ performance. The first is the possibility that other
changes occurred at the same time as the switch to
salaries, which may have had different effects on the
performance of referees in the Premier League compared
with the Championship. But our analysis suggests that this
is not the case.
The second concern is that the employer offered the
salary contracts to the most able referees so that the
contract is simply an indicator of a more able referee. 
We are able to deal with this problem by controlling for
referee ‘fixed effects’.
Our data are virtually all the matches played in the top
two divisions of English football in the 12 seasons
between 1997/98 and 2008/09 (we have data for 11,169
of the 11,184 matches). They include all 168 referees
officiating at these games over the period. Our measure of
referees’ performance is the number of yellow and red
cards that they issue in a game.
Yellow cards are issued as a warning to a player when he
has broken the rules, either by fouling an opponent,
handling the ball or for showing dissent. A red card is
shown if the player commits a second offence worthy of a
yellow card. Red cards can also be shown for a particularly
egregious first offence, such as violent conduct  or a foul
that directly prevents a goal-scoring opportunity. Red cards
lead to the player being sent off and suspended from
subsequent games.
Issuing many cards is often a sign that the referee has lost
control of the game. Good referees are able to deal with
most incidents without brandishing cards by
communicating firmly with players from the outset.
Indeed, there is anecdotal evidence that Premier League
officials hoped that the introduction of salary contracts
would improve communication between referees and
players. Other studies have shown a high negative
correlation between the number of cards awarded and
subjective assessments of referees’ performance by expert
panels (Frick et al, 2008).
We find improvements in the performance of referees
among those who moved onto salary contracts relative to
those who do not. The salaried referees issued an average
of half a card less per game. This is a reduction of around
one sixth since, on average in our data, referees show
three cards per game.
The finding is robust to controls for referee fixed effects,
which indicates that the result is not driven by salary
contracts being awarded to better referees, although this
does account for part of the effect. Nor is it sensitive to
workers sorting into or out of the profession. Thus it
appears that one can improve officiating at football games
by using good personnel economics.
This article summarises ‘Do Salaried Workers Perform Better
than Piece Rate Workers?’ by Alex Bryson, Babatunde Buraimo
and Rob Simmons, a forthcoming CEP Discussion Paper.
Alex Bryson of the National Institute of Economic and Social
Research is a visiting research fellow in CEP’s labour markets
programme. Babatunde Buraimo is at the University of
Central Lancashire. Rob Simmons is at Lancaster University
Management School.
Further reading
Bernd Frick, Oliver Gürtler and Joachim Prinz (2008) 
‘Men in Black: Monitoring and Performance of German Soccer
Referees’, in Helmut Dietl et al (eds) Soccer: Economics 
of a Passion, Hofmann.
Canice Prendergast (1999) ‘The Provision of Incentives in
Firms’, Journal of Economic Literature 37: 7-63.
Performance
improved among
salaried referees:
on average, they
issued half a card
less per game
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A
substantial body of
medical research has
demonstrated the dangers
of exposure to
environmental tobacco
smoke. Passive smoking has been linked
to a number of serious illnesses, such as
lung cancer and heart disease in adults.
And it particularly affects the health of
young children and babies, causing
asthma, bronchitis and sudden infant
death syndrome. In the United States, the
Environmental Protection Agency
estimates that exposure to smoke causes
about 200,000 lower respiratory tract
infections in young children each year,
resulting in 10,000 hospitalisations. 
Public intervention uses two
instruments to try to discourage smoking:
directly, by limiting or banning smoking in
public places; and indirectly, by raising
taxes on cigarettes. Economic evaluations
of the impact of these policies have mainly
focused on the latter. For example, our
research has shown that taxes reduce the
number of cigarettes smoked, but smokers
compensate by smoking each cigarette
more intensively (Adda and Cornaglia,
2006).
Few studies have considered the effect
of bans, and those that do focus on the
impact on smokers. One example shows
that workplace bans decrease the
prevalence of smoking among those who
work (Evans et al, 1999). But there is
hardly any evidence on the effectiveness
of either raising taxes or restricting
smoking in reducing exposure to tobacco
smoke among non-smokers.
Public debate on the effectiveness of
different measures has intensified, and
policies to ban smoking are often justified
on the grounds of protecting non-smokers
rather than smokers. But there is to our
knowledge no study evaluating the
response of passive smoking to the
growing set of regulations and clean air
legislation passed in the last decade or to
changes in excise taxes.
The emergence of 
smoking bans
Just as in the UK, widespread smoking
bans and smoking restrictions are a
relatively novel phenomenon in the United
States. Some attempts to ban smoking
and the sale of cigarettes were made
during Prohibition in the 1920s, when 15
states banned cigarette sales. But these
laws were repealed by the end of that
decade.
Half a century later, as research
progressively made clear the effect of
tobacco smoke, support for smoking bans
Smoking bans have been widely introduced in
recent years in an effort to reduce non-smokers’
exposure to tobacco smoke. Jérôme Adda and
Francesca Cornaglia evaluate the effect of
these restrictions – and of taxes on cigarettes –
on the incidence of passive smoking and, in
particular, their unintended consequences 
for children.
Passive smoking:
the effect of bans and taxes
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in public places has steadily risen. The
proportion of individuals supporting a
total ban in restaurants increased from
20% in 1985 to 54% in 2005. And local
authorities and governments have come
under pressure from anti-tobacco groups
and the general public to limit the
exposure of non-smokers and generally to
discourage smoking.
The first smoking bans to be
introduced in the United States were in
place in Minnesota in the mid-1970s. They
required restaurants to have a non-
smoking section, while exempting bars.
During the 1970s and the 1980s, smoking
bans were progressively imposed, usually
by requiring separate areas for smokers
and non-smokers, as in airlines in 1973.
During the 1990s, US smoking bans
became more stringent, with the
imposition of total bans in workplaces,
public places, restaurants and bars. These
were pioneered by municipalities and
counties, mainly in California in the early
1990s. The first states to impose such a
ban were California and Utah with 100%
smoke-free restaurants in 1995.
The impact of bans on
passive smokers
Our research uses data on smoking bans
obtained from the American Non
Smokers’ Rights Foundation, which
collected the date of introduction of
smoking bans and whether these were
introduced at city, county or state level.
We merge these data with information 
on state level excise taxes. Figure 1 plots
the time trend of these policies at the
national level. 
Excise taxes have risen from around 30
cents per pack in the late 1980s to more
than 80 cents in 2006, with a sharp rise
from 2001 onwards. Hardly any bans were
in place before the mid-1990s. But in
2006, about 40% of the population was
living in an area with a smoking ban in
workplaces or with smoking bans in bars
and restaurants.
We have a direct measure of passive
smoking, which has not previously been
used in economic research. The
concentration of cotinine (a chemical
naturally derived from nicotine) in blood,
saliva or urine samples is a good marker of
exposure to environmental smoke (Jarvis et
al, 2000). Using this indicator, we can
evaluate the effect of bans and taxes on
smokers and non-smokers and, in
particular, their unintended consequences
for children. 
Analysing the effect of smoking
regulation on smoking, time use and
passive smoking, we show that smoking
bans can have two distinct effects on non-
smokers’ exposure to tobacco smoke: they
decrease exposure in public places but can
lead to a perverse increase in exposure by
displacing smoking towards private areas. 
We find that during the last two
decades, bans in workplaces, bars and
restaurants have led to a relative increase
in the exposure of non-smokers,
particularly those who share a household
with smokers. 
We hypothesise that such bans
displace smoking to places where non-
smokers are more exposed. To support
these findings, we provide evidence of the
Figure 1:
Bans and excise taxes by year (US average) Children who
share a 
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smokers suffer
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adversely from
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effect of bans on smoking behaviour and
how individuals spend their time in various
locations.
We show that there is no clear
evidence that smoking bans have a causal
effect either on the prevalence of smoking
or on smoking cessation and attempted
quits. Using time use data, we show
evidence of a displacement of smokers
away from bars and restaurants when
smoke-free laws are passed. The evidence
therefore supports the hypothesis of a
displacement of smokers to places shared
with non-smokers, such as watching TV
with the children, who then get more
exposure to tobacco smoke.
In contrast, we find that changes in
tobacco taxes have a significant effect of
reducing exposure to environmental
smoke. The effect is particularly sizable for
children who are exposed to their parents’
smoke. This suggests that excise taxes are
an efficient tool to curb passive smoking
as smokers cut down on cigarettes
smoked in the company of non-smokers,
especially children.
The value of bans for
reducing passive smoking
Our results question the usefulness of
bans in reducing smoking exposure for
non-smokers. More precisely, we show
that policies aimed at reducing exposure
to tobacco smoke induce changes in
behaviour, which can offset these policies.
It is therefore of crucial importance to
understand how smoking behaviour is
affected by regulations. To date, economic
research has not gone far enough in
studying smoking behaviour to be able to
evaluate their effect on non-smokers. It is
not enough to show that smokers react to
prices or taxes. Information on which
particular cigarette is cut down during the
day, where smokers smoke and with
whom are also relevant.
There are complex interactions at play
and considerable variation in their effects
across socio-economic groups. Using a
biomarker such as cotinine concentrations
is a very direct way of evaluating the
overall effect of interventions and the
induced changes in behaviour.
On the policy side, it is clearly
important when designing public policies
aimed at reducing tobacco exposure of
non-smokers to distinguish between the
different public places where bans are
introduced. Displacing smoking towards
places where non-smokers spend time is
particularly inefficient.
The displacement may also increase
health disparities across socio-economic
groups and in particular among children, 
a vulnerable group with little choice to
avoid contamination. Children are
particularly prone to tobacco-related
diseases, and poor health in childhood has
lasting consequences not only for future
health but also for the accumulation of
human capital. 
Governments in many countries are
under pressure to limit passive smoking.
Some pressure groups can be very vocal
about these issues and suggest bold and
radical reforms. Their point of view is
laudable but too simplistic in the sense
that they do not take account of how
public policies can generate perverse
incentives and effects. Our study provides
insights on how to design optimal policies
to curb passive smoking. 
Excise taxes
lead smokers to
cut down
smoking in the
company of
non-smokers,
especially
children
This article summarises ‘The Effect 
of Bans and Taxes on Passive Smoking’ 
by Jérôme Adda and Francesca Cornaglia,
CEP Discussion Paper No. 950
(http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/
dp0950.pdf).
Jérôme Adda is at the European University
Institute, Florence, and the Institute for Fiscal
Studies. Francesca Cornaglia is a research
associate in CEP’s labour markets and
wellbeing programmes and a lecturer at
Queen Mary University of London.
Further reading
Jérôme Adda and Francesca Cornaglia (2006)
‘Taxes, Cigarette Consumption and Smoking
Intensity’, American Economic Review 96(4):
1013-28.
William Evans, Matthew Farrelly and Edward
Montgomery (1999) ‘Do Workplace Smoking
Bans Reduce Smoking?’, American Economic
Review 89(4): 728-47.
Martin Jarvis et al (2000) ‘Children’s Exposure
to Passive Smoking in England since the
1980s: Cotinine Evidence from Population
Surveys’, British Medical Journal 321: 343-45.
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The educational background 
of postgrad students
Students who went to independent schools are more
likely to study for a postgraduate degree than students
who went to state schools, according to our research,
which has been commissioned by the Sutton Trust. This is
despite the fact that students from state schools of the
same class and background are more likely to get a good
university degree than similar students who come from
independent schools. 
Our study, which is feeding into the government’s review
of postgraduate education, finds that the number of
postgraduates studying in the UK increased by 48% from
129,700 in 1995 to 248,400 in 2008. Over the same
period, the proportion of
postgraduates from overseas
has increased from 30% to
55%. Full- and part-time
postgraduates pay at least
£2.75 billion in university fees
a year.
One in six (17%) of those
studying six months after
graduation were educated
privately as compared with
14% of undergraduate
students and 7% of school
pupils. Nearly a third (30%)
were from higher managerial
or professional families as
compared with 27% of
undergraduates and 13% of the population as a whole. 
More than two thirds (68%) of independent school
educated university students obtained a first or upper
second class degree (the usual requirements for pursuing a
postgraduate course) in 2008 compared with 64% of
state educated students.
But comparing like-for-like students (those studying the
same degree subject and from the same university, ethnic
group and family background), those educated at
independent schools were 4% less likely to achieve a first
or upper second class degree than otherwise similar
students educated in state schools.
Our survey also finds that postgraduates with a masters
degree earn on average £1.75 million over their lifetimes,
while postgraduates who complete a doctorate earn on
average £1.9 million – 15% and 23% more respectively
than a university graduate with £1.5 million in average
lifetime earnings. The average starting salary for a UK
postgraduate was £24,000 in 2008 compared with the
average starting salary for a UK undergraduate of
£19,500.
Comparing students with the same characteristics (and
averaging over the years 2004/06/08), those educated in
independent schools are 
1.2 percentage points more likely to carry on to
postgraduate education than
their state-educated
counterparts. This difference is
small but it is statistically
significant. It is also present
despite the fact that university
students educated at
independent schools are
slightly less likely to achieve a
first or upper second class
degree than otherwise 
similar students educated in
state schools.
We also find that three
quarters (76%) of
independent school pupils
who went to university (in the
years 2004-08), graduated from a leading research
university, compared with four in ten (39%) state school
pupils who went to university.
This article summarises ‘The Social Composition 
and Future Earnings of Postgraduates’, the interim 
report of a research project commissioned by the 
Sutton Trust and being undertaken by Stephen Machin and
Richard Murphy (www.suttontrust.com/reports/
Sutton_Trust_Postgraduate_report_01032010.pdf).
Stephen Machin is CEP’s research director and professor of
economics at University College London. Richard Murphy is a
research economist in CEP’s education and skills programme.
in brief...
Has the boom in postgraduate courses in the UK over recent
years had a negative impact on intergenerational mobility?
Research by Stephen Machin and Richard Murphy suggests
that there is a small but significant imbalance in favour of
undergraduates who have been privately educated.
One in every six 
postgraduate students went 
to an independent school
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A
fter 15 years of near
continuous job growth,
the UK’s employment rate
in the middle of 2008
stood at around 75% of
the working age population, a rate
broadly in line with previous employment
peaks in 1968, 1978 and 1989. The UK
had also experienced 12 years of near
continuous decline in unemployment after
1993, following the double digit rates of
the early 1980s and the early 1990s. 
Despite the predictions of some, the
introduction of the minimum wage in
1999 appears to have had little effect on
employment over the last decade. In
2005, the unemployment rate fell below
5% for the first time since the 1970s and
hovered around this rate for the next three
years. Then in 2008, the UK entered what
was to be its worst recession since the
Second World War in terms of lost output. 
During the latest recession, GDP fell by
The recession of 
2008-09 inflicted a 
larger cumulative loss of
UK output than any of
the previous post-war
recessions, yet there has
been a relatively low loss
of employment, at least
so far. Paul Gregg and
Jonathan Wadsworth
look for an explanation.
Figure 1:
Annual change in UK employment and GDP,
1979-2009
Source: Labour Force Survey, Office for National Statistics.
-7%
-6%
-5%
-4%
-3%
-2%
-1%
0
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
2009200720052003200119991997199519931991198919871985198319811979
■ GDP – annual change
■ Employment – annual change
P
er
ce
n
ta
ge
 c
h
an
ge
s 
on
 y
ea
r
Jobs in
the recession
CentrePiece Summer 2010
27
over 6%, which is worse than in the
recessions of the 1980s or 1990s (see
Figure 1). What’s more, with six quarters
of falling output, this recession was both
longer and deeper than the previous two.
In the 1980s recession, the percentage
decline in employment was broadly in line
with the percentage fall in GDP. In the
1990s recession, the relative fall in the
employment rate was somewhat larger
than the percentage decline in GDP.
Moreover, in the previous two
recessions, the fall in employment was
only halted 12 to 14 quarters after the
onset of recession (see Figure 2).
Employment then also remained below its
pre-recession levels for 18 months or so
after the recovery in output started.
Typically GDP growth of 2% or higher
seems to be needed before employment
starts to rise again (or unemployment
starts to fall).
But the latest recession was strikingly
different. While the fall in GDP was
markedly worse than in past recessions,
the loss of employment was much smaller
– roughly 3% of the initial level – and the
period over which employment fell was
much shorter than in the past. 
The number of UK jobs saved so far
relative to what might be expected by the
drop in GDP amounts to roughly one
million. How has this happened? 
The first point to consider is how
widespread this pattern has been across
countries and whether it is related to their
institutional differences.
Table 1 shows that France and Canada
have escaped relatively lightly from the
recession with around a 3% fall in GDP
and a similar rise in unemployment, in line
with past norms. In the United States,
Spain and Ireland, the rise in
unemployment exceeded the fall 
in output.
But there are a large number of
countries with smaller than expected
employment falls. Some of them adopted
a deliberate strategy to encourage short-
time working rather than lose jobs. In
Germany, the government has supported
a policy of short-time working, and similar
employment subsidy schemes are
operating in Italy, the Netherlands and
Figure 2:
Employment levels from the start of the recession for the
1980s, 1990s and 2008-09 recessions
Source: Office for National Statistics.
Index at start of recession = 100 for 1979 Q4, 1990 Q2 and 2008 Q1 respectively.
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Percentage change Percentage point change 
in GDP in unemployment
2008 Q1-2009 Q2 2008 Q1-2009 Q4
Countries with small unemployment rise relative to fall in GDP
UK -5.9% 2.7 
Sweden -6.1% 2.9
Countries with small unemployment rise relative to GDP 
and with employment subsidies
Italy -6.5% 1.8 
Germany -6.3% -0.1
Netherlands -5.85% 1.2
Japan -7.1% 1.3
Countries with similar sized unemployment rise and GDP falls 
France -3.1% 2.4
Countries with larger unemployment rises than GDP falls
United States -3.5% 5.0
Spain -4.3% 9.7
Ireland -9.6% 8.2
Countries with little or no GDP fall 
Australia +1.5% 1.5
Table 1:
The percentage change in GDP and unemployment
across selected countries over the recession
This recession represents
the first serious test of
the UK’s active labour
market policies
Japan. The UK is one of a smaller number
of countries to have experienced relatively
small employment losses without a
deliberate government-funded strategy of
fewer working hours.
Does this mean that employment in
the UK has benefited from its putative
flexible labour market? The evidence does
not support this view. The countries with
low employment loss are not those
regarded as having flexible labour markets.
The United States is held to be the prime
example of the flexible model and Ireland
is also a relatively less regulated country,
and both countries experienced large falls
in employment. Spain has strong labour
protection but also has a large share of
temporary jobs, which are weakly
protected and have proved to be
vulnerable in the downturn.
In contrast, Sweden, Italy, Germany
and the Netherlands have relatively high
levels of employment protection and
relatively good employment records over
the recession. In short, there appears to be
little relationship between a country’s
supposed degree of labour market
flexibility and employment losses in 
this recession.
So what explains the UK outcome? It
seems that the answer consists of several
elements. First, policy-makers were better
prepared this time round. After all, there
had been two severe recessions well
within the memory of most adults over
the age of 30. The understandings that
were gained undoubtedly helped frame a
policy response in the latest downturn,
allied with a greater willingness to
intervene than in the past.
This recession was notable in that,
unlike the previous two recessions, it was
not exacerbated by a deliberate policy of
fiscal and monetary tightening to squeeze
demand out of the system to get inflation
down. Instead, unemployment rose
because of an old-fashioned collapse in
demand following the bursting of a
financial bubble.
Moreover, this time round there has
been a deliberate larger and more rapid
loosening of fiscal and monetary policy to
try to offset the fall in demand. Policy-
makers did the right thing in saving the
banks, cutting interest rates and inducing
fiscal and monetary stimuli, which have all
helped to maintain demand and firms’
cash flow.
Workers also did the right thing in
accepting lower nominal wage growth
which kept firms’ costs down and reduced
the need to cut costs through layoffs. At
the same time, real take-home pay was
sustained by cuts in interest rates and VAT
and this may have maintained consumer
demand. And firms did the right thing in,
wherever possible, holding onto valuable
labour in the face of the pressure on
profits and the severe nature of the crisis.
Employers entered the recession in
good financial shape and this has also
helped avoid the level of job shedding that
occurs when firms get into deep financial
trouble. But the recession means that
firms have under-used labour at the
moment and this will allow them to grow
without the need to hire much in the
short to medium term. And if demand
continues to be weak, then job shedding
is likely to continue on a slow but
sustained basis.
This recession represents the first
serious test of the active labour market
policies that have been put in place since
1996. Increased conditionality on welfare
claimants to take active steps to secure
work, packages of support services for job
search available to those claiming benefits
and use of outside providers to deliver
these services rather than Job Centres are
all innovations aimed at keeping
individuals in the labour market and
maintaining search effectiveness.
Reforms that increased the financial
returns to working relative to not working
– the minimum wage and in-work tax
credits – should also help continue to
make work pay through a downturn,
when job prospects may not be as good
as when the economy is doing well.
The signs are that unemployment also
has not risen as much as many expected.
This is to be welcomed, though the ability
of the new policies to withstand a build
up of long-term unemployment that has
in the past followed in the wake of a
recession is still to be tested.
The cost has been huge for the public
finances and in terms of productivity and
this will affect cost competitiveness going
forward. There are also serious jobless
concentrations among more marginal
groups that 15 years of sustained growth
did little to remedy. For some groups,
there has been a ratchet upwards in
joblessness from the 1980s onwards and
this will need to be addressed when the
economy recovers.
Yet overall, it seems that the labour
market has performed better than
expected. Whether this generally good
news will be sustained as the focus shifts to
cuts in public spending and employers
begin to assess their longer-term
employment needs is less clear.
Employment took eight to nine years to get
back to pre-recession levels after the last
two recessions. This time it might be less if
a second wave of job shedding is avoided.
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This article summarises ‘The UK Labour
Market and the 2008-2009 Recession’ by 
Paul Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth, CEP
Discussion Paper No. 950 (http://cep.lse.ac.uk/
pubs/download/occasional/op025.pdf). An
extended version of the paper will appear in 
The Labour Market in Winter: The State of
Working Britain, a book to be published by
Oxford University Press later this year.
Paul Gregg is a professor of economics at the
Centre for Market and Public Organisation at
the University of Bristol. Jonathan
Wadsworth is a professor of economics at
Royal Holloway, University of London. Both
are senior research fellows in CEP’s labour
markets programme.
There is no relationship
between a country’s
degree of labour market
flexibility and
employment losses in
this recession
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CEP is pleased to announce
the latest volume in 
‘The State of Working
Britain’ series.
The third volume of the series – The
Labour Market in Winter: The State of
Working Britain 2010 edited by Paul
Gregg and Jonathan Wadsworth – will
be published in November 2010 by
Oxford University Press.
The latest volume provides an overview
of key issues concerning the
performance of the labour market and
policy, with the focus this time around
on the latest recession and its aftermath.
The intention is to be an indispensable
reference source on contemporary labour
market developments in the UK, which
will be of lasting use to academics,
students, practitioners and policy-
makers. 
Topics covered include:
 Employment and unemployment
trends in the downturn
 Immigration
 An assessment of the efficacy of
family-friendly work schemes
 An evaluation of education reforms
 Wage inequality and
intergenerational income mobility
 Happiness, wellbeing and job security
over the economic cycle
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